Archive for October, 2014


October 28, 2014

A historical tale about two gigantic powers, with more things in common than apparent diversity, which ended up in a mortal fight, exterminating in the process about fifty millions of their people (Soviet power had exterminated several more millions of Russians before that fight by itself), destroying their lands and benefiting what both declared as their first and foremost enemy, transnational capital.

Nazism and Communism were specular, not different, as much as Communism and Consumerism are. What they all have in common is the rejection of Christ, the substitution of Heaven with the earth and the banishment of the Spirit from humanity and the creation, putting idiotic fables, blind matter or fake spirituality in their place. All for the good pleasure of the “wickedness in the high places”, no matter how noble the intentions of the proponents of those fables are. This I mean when I say that the enemy creates, owns and controls all the thesis and antithesis concocted by men in the vain attempt to overcome the permanent devilish grip upon human societies, all of them ending up in more of the same but under a brand new fictional narrative.

Only the renovation of a spirit of understanding and friendship between the German and the Russian world, the restoration of mutual trust between the East and the West, pretty much what was destroyed by the Papist schism a thousand years ago, can ensure a peaceful and prosperous future for Eurasian people and lands. This is exactly what the Demonocratic Empire has always and strenuosly prevented since its first crying, the Cromwellian bloodbath in England (with the first regicide), and what is trying to prevent today with its aggression in the Ukraine, where lately it’s implemented a brand new meaning for the concept of “free election”: first, forbid the partecipation of every opponents to the electoral process and then let the people absolutely free to vote for you. 

It’s not necessary an ecclesiastical union for this renewed unity to happen, a return of the schismatics and heretics to the Church. That’s ruled out, because Vatican hierarchies are on the other side by now, almost completely corrupted and tamed, while Protestants cannot even pretend to be a shell of a church. There must be an union of people, but nevertheless this union is possible only in Christ, in His Spirit through His Word. Christ is the only antidote for men against the evil, to avoid being hijacked and transformed in a yet another antithesis, a mere dialectical point in the hands of the masters of public discourse, just waiting to be synthesized in a new form of demonic rule. Christ is the only armor and weapon we have Who does not belong to this world and therefore to whom this world belong, that is the assassin since the beginning and the father of lies (John 8, 44). There can surely be an union with people who are outside the Church:


Now John answered and said, “Master, we saw someone casting out demons in Your name, and we forbade him because he does not follow with us.”


But Jesus said to him, “Do not forbid him, for he who is not against us is on our side.”

What currently prevents this reciprocal understanding and union is a double braided misunderstanding, that is the usual outcome when people lack a spiritual discernment, which is possible ONLY through His Spirit. Not only the Western (German) man is blinded by a millennium of guidance and teachings by wolves in sheep’s clothes and absence of Communion with Christ, since the Frankish takeover of the Patriarchate of Rome and all West, but also the Eastern (Russian) man is poisoned in his discernment by centuries of slow infiltration of the western malady, culminating in the final apostasy and perjury by useful idiots like Kerensky a century ago, which gave the go-ahead to the most bestial band of assassins ever unleashed over the Rus’ in her millenary history, whose demonic rule deprived her people of every spiritual nourishment, not even the hopelessly distorted one still available in the West, for three whole generations, and after did consign the fourth generation directly in the hands of the devil with the tragedy of the sudden triggered collapse of the Soviet Union.

A decade of atheist Consumerism almost succeeded where seven decades of atheist Communism did not; the Rus’ was nearly annihilated and only the repentance of the Moscow Patriarchate, with the glorification of the Imperial Martyrs and all the New Martyrs and Confessors of the Faith, did prevent the definitive fall of the last bastion of resistance to the Antichrist. Nevertheless, the repentance has been slow, uncertain, ambiguous, hesitant, and is far from completed! You cannot claim repentance and still have the mummy of the assassin-in-chief of the Rus’ defiling the very heart of her sacred power. Reconciliation is an empty word without consequential deeds. Repentance is not a word, it’s action! It’s acknowledgment and accusation of sin, its refusal and a further life away from it.

The Eastern man is still convalescent. His discernment is still hazy, promiscuous, just a little better than the Western one. He has the great blessing to be able to commune with Christ, but he must remember that without discernment even that is of little avail, up to the point of becoming guilty of the Body and the Blood of the Lord. Resisting the Spirit, you cannot discern His Body and Blood, and the Spirit is the Spirit of Truth, Who alone can console and make you free.

Therefore, while the Western man sees him today still as homo sovieticus (apart from those who increasingly are breaking free in the West from the petty propaganda and unceasing lies of their media brothels), the Eastern man sees himself as a Christian proud of his Soviet heritage.

The double braided misunderstanding so continues undaunted. Russians were the first and most numerous victims of the Bolsheviks assassins and yet today they alone must bear the blame for the crimes of their own executioners. It’s true that most of Bolsheviks were Russian too, but it’s also true that Bolsheviks were in every other nation of the Soviet bloc, Latvia, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, et cetera, and just like in Russia they were the executioners and traitors of their own people. Yet nobody sees the people in those nations as homo sovieticus. The official narrative will tell you that they have changed. Well, of course they have changed master (who is in fact always the same, with a brand new suite), but would you please then indicate what of the current constitutional, social and economic structures in Russia is soviet in nature? Until you do, can you please just shut up!??

It’s true that the core of the Soviet power was Russians, but in fact the Bolsheviks just seized those power structures and used them to kill Russia, first of all! None of the Soviet leaders were Russians. In fact, the Soviet Union was the most rabid and ruthless enemy of everything Russian ever registered in the history of the Rus’. Ever! They tried to destroy every single drop of the Russian heritage, under every aspect! They tried to destroy the Russian soul, and in the tentative they exterminated tens of millions of her children and destroyed almost every beautiful thing the Rus’ had produced, material and immaterial. In comparison, Western crusaders, Polish papists, the Mongols and Napoleon were Russia’s passionate admirers!

Yet Russians still revere and cherish their torturers and executioners, those who violently took away Christ from them and gave Lenin in exchange, whose mummy still shares honors with Christ and His Church near the Kremlin. Still they are bogged down in the ambiguous rhetoric of the Great Patriotic War and the Russian State forbids by law to challenge the outcome of that Kangaroo Court in Nuremberg. Of course, that war was great and patriotic, because they fought and died to resist bravely foreign invaders of rare cruelty, to liberate their fatherland and destroy a mortal enemy. Of course, all those soldiers must be honored and remembered forever. At the same time, however, it must be remembered that they did not fight under the flag of the fatherland, their flag was the Soviet one and their leaders were the torturers and executioners of the fatherland, the usurpers of the Russian power and the destroyers of the Russian heritage. It must be remembered that the Nazist aggression to Russia did most probably anticipate by only a few weeks a Soviet aggression to Germany. It must be remembered that outside their fatherland they did not liberate any people or land, but just substituted the Nazist power with the Soviet power, a cruelty with another cruelty, an oppression with another oppression, the same oppression that those flags and leaders had unleashed on the Russian land and people before. Until they remember this, in thoughts and deeds, they will keep on suffering a sort of bipolar disturb of personality, they will be stuck permanently in the middle of the ford and Russia will evolve anew in a mere antithesis to the Western thesis, ready to be synthesized in the usual devilish blob.

Russia today is the only place in the whole world where Christ is starting to be publicly witnessed again and her people, her whole society is getting cleansed and healed by this; but you cannot witness Christ and the Antichrist at the same time! The contradiction is irreconcilable and must be overcome. I am aware that it requires time and must be sorted out very carefully, but they must be aware that it must be overcome!

As long as Russians will not publicly relinquish, denounce and repent of this damned legacy, this legacy will continue to damn them. You cannot be a Christian and a Communist at the same time, whoever pretend to reconcile the two things has no real understanding of Christ or has no real understanding of Communism. Let him stop deluding himself! How can the love of Christ and the keeping of His Word be reconciled with the proud celebration and fond remembrance of those who crucified Him millions upon millions of times since 1917, as Lenin, Stalin and their cohorts of Jewish revolutionaries have done? How can Christ be reconciled with an atheist terror system imposed on the lands which were the house of the Most Holy Theotokos and where thousands upon thousands of Saints have walked, a system which did negate since the very beginning each and every of Christ’s teaching and God’s Commandment, which desecrated and destroyed countless human lives and tried to destroy the very soul of the Rus’? HOW?

Flush down the toilet of history Marx and Lenin and substitute them with Christ. Become a Christian, do not just pretend to be one (like Russians’ ancestors under the reign of St. Nicholas II), but LIVE Christ, everyone, behave accordingly and behold: a just society, peaceful, prosperous and real freedom and real strength is all around you, by consequence. 

For without Christ, Russia is just copulation and cruelty!

Fëdor Michajlovič Dostoevskij


Revising the history of the Second World War’s crucial Russo-German campaign is very much a work in progress, nowhere more so than in Russia and Germany. Ever since Viktor Suvorov (Vladimir Rezun) broke the ice a decade ago with his sensational Ledokol (published in English as Icebreaker [reviewed in the Journal of Historical Review, (Nov.-Dec. 1997)]), Russian historians have been reexamining the many myths, legends, and fantasies associated with the outbreak of the death duel between Communism and National Socialism. The role of Joseph Stalin, in particular, has aroused the most heated controversy.

In Russia, the debate has involved two major groups. The first asserts that the Soviet Union had no aggressive designs against Germany or Europe and was unprepared for war, while the second maintains that Stalin and the Red Army indeed had plans for a surprise attack against Germany and Europe, but were beaten to the punch by Hitler.

Contending Factions

To the first group have belonged such notables as the late Marshal Georgi Zhukov, journalist Lev Bezymenski (also professor at the Academy of Military Sciences), General M. A. Gareyev, V. A. Anfilov, and Yu. A. Gorkov. This group, in general, also contends that Stalin had decapitated the Red Army by purging many high-ranking officers just before the war; that he was too trusting of Hitler, wrongly believing that the Führer would never deliberately initiate a two-front war; and that Stalin was the cause of Communism’s failure. These views are shared by many, regardless of political leanings.

An Israeli, Gabriel Gorodetsky, much ballyhooed in the English-speaking world, also fits in this company. Gorodetsky is a colleague of Lev Bezymenski, as he was of the late General Dmitri Volkogonov. Gorodetsky, Suvorov contends, has been granted unparalleled access to selected archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the General Staff, the NKVD, the GRU, and other records usually closed to researchers, above all revisionists, who might probe too deeply. For this reason Suvorov suspects Gorodetsky of being a conduit for information that the Russian government chooses to have disseminated.

To the second group belong military historians such as Viktor Suvorov, Mikhail Meltiukhov, V. A. Nevezhin, V. D. Danilov, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, as well as several Germans (Joachim Hoffmann, Wolfgang Strauss, Fritz Becker) and Austrians (Heinz Magenheimer, Ernst Topitsch). (See review of Topitsch’s Stalin’s War in JHR, [Summer 1988]). They argue that Stalin trusted no one, least of all Hitler; that Stalin had, together with Marshal Zhukov, devised his own plan for a surprise offensive against Germany, with the ultimate goal of establishing Communism in Europe; and that it was the USSR, not Germany, which was better prepared for war. Suvorov has also argued that Stalin’s purges actually improved the Red Army, by ridding it of the heavy-handed political commissars, most of whom were Trotskyite thugs despised by the people. As is well known, many of Trotsky’s followers were his fellow Jews, often foreign born rather than native to Russia.

The American historians Richard Raack and R. H. S. Stolfi (see review in JHR [Nov.-Dec. 1995]) have joined the debate, lending it a worldwide dimension. Professor Raack in particular has reinforced the arguments of the Suvorov group, writing that “in fact the discussion is now international … the genie of truth is out of the bottle.”

The first group has been taxed with harboring Stalinist apologists for the old Soviet Establishment, the second of seeking to justify Hitler’s German invasion. Polemics aside, the historiographical roots of the division are manifest in the reliance of the first group on the Soviet political literature to substantiate its arguments, as opposed to the second group’s reliance on historical analysis based on military science, studying and comparing troop deployments, weapons systems, and so on.

In the past few years, several major books have appeared from representatives of both sides of the dispute. Gorodetsky, supported in his research by many former Soviet Jews now residing in Israel, has recently published Grand Delusion. Widely circulated in the West, it has won the acclaim of most of its Anglo-American reviewers. The irrepressible Suvorov, who resides in England, has published his fourth major book on the war, entitled Samoubiystvo (“Suicide”), dealing with events immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities, while Meltiukhov, currently associated with the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Documentation and Archival Science, has just published Upushchennyy shans Stalina (“Stalin’s Lost Opportunity”). Regrettably, with the exception of Icebreaker, none of Suvorov’s and Meltiukhov’s works are currently available in English, and they have only rarely been reviewed or evaluated in the English-speaking world. Finally, an excellent translation of Stalin’s War of Extermination, by Joachim Hoffmann, historian at Germany’s Military History Research Office (MGFA), has now been made available to English speakers. This book has gone through several editions in Germany, and is widely read there.

Suvorov’s works enjoy the greatest sales and circulation of serious Russian literature on the war. At first his opponents (almost all professional historians) tried to ignore him. Later, when compelled to recognize his work, they attempted to dismiss his theses as the product of a fantast who had had no access to official documents whatsoever. Yet, working solely from Soviet open source literature on the war, Suvorov deduced the Soviet plan to invade Germany, predicting that in time official documents would be found to substantiate his conclusions. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, such documents have surfaced with increasing frequency, and in recent years Suvorov has found a perfect partner in Meltiukhov, who, with his experience in documentation and archival science and his easier access to Soviet-era records, has provided documentation for Suvorov’s theses.

Plan of Attack

The Zhukov Plan of May 15, 1941, discussed briefly in these pages last year (see JHR [Nov.-Dec. 2000]), continues to be the focus of analysis and discussion. Recently, on the fifty-ninth anniversary of the German attack, Vladimir Sergeyev described and published excerpts from the Zhukov document, which was discovered in the Archives of the President of the Russian Federation some years ago. For ultimate security, the original twelve-page text had been handwritten by then Major General, later Marshal, A. M. Vasilevski, and addressed to the chairman of the USSR Council of Peoples Commissars, Joseph Stalin. The document, marked “Top Secret! Of Great Importance! Stalin’s Eyes Only! One Copy Only!,” was authorized and approved by People’s Defense Minister S. K. Timoshenko and Zhukov, then chief of the Red Army general staff.

A key passage in the war plan not previously cited in these pages reads:

In order to prevent a surprise German attack and to destroy the German Army, I consider it essential that under no circumstances should the initiative for freedom of action be given to the German High Command[. I consider it essential] to preempt enemy deployment, to attack the German Army when it is still in the stage of deployment and has not yet had time to organize his front and the interaction between his service arms.[The word for “preempt” was underlined twice in the original document. — D. M.]

Thus did Zhukov propose to Stalin precisely what the German Army would do to his forces a month later.

The Suvorov school and certain German military analysts speculate that Stalin’s failure to attack before the German onslaught of June 22, 1941, was probably because his own forces had not yet fully deployed for the offensive. Sergeyev, on the other hand, suggests that the attack plan prepared by Zhukov was faulty.

Upon his return from the successful blitzkrieg operation he had orchestrated in the battle of Khalkin-Gol in Mongolia (August 1939), Marshal Zhukov was put in charge of the Kiev Special Military District, where he commanded the Soviet Southwestern and Western fronts. His plan of May 15, 1941, assigned these fronts the task of destroying the Wehrmacht units before them, then advancing southwest across Poland to the German border. This operation was intended to cut German forces off from the Balkan theater of operations and from their Romanian and Hungarian allies, including their vital oil fields.

Zhukov was unaware that the main deployment of German forces was not on the Soviet left flank, but in Army Group Center, further to the north. Thus, had Soviet forces attacked toward Cracow-Lublin, as Zhukov’s plan called for, Army Group Center could easily have cut through the exposed right (northern) flank of the Soviet thrust, upset the Soviet offensive, and then advanced along the Minsk-Smolensk line toward Moscow. In that event, the Red Army would have found itself in an even worse situation than after the outbreak of the actual German offensive on June 22. Zhukov admitted as much later to military historian V. A. Anfilov: “In retrospect it is good that he [Stalin] did not agree with us. Otherwise, our forces might have suffered a catastrophe.”

Stalin’s Aims

In a more detailed study of the May 15 document, L. A. Bezymenski notes that the plan had even more ambitious goals. After completion of the first stage of the offensive, Soviet forces were to turn north and northwest to destroy the northern wing of the German front, thereby occupying East Prussia and all of Poland. Meanwhile, to the north, the Red Army would once again invade Finland. According to Bezymenski, Zhukov’s bold offensive plan had very probably been influenced by Stalin’s speech of May 5 to Soviet military academy graduates, in which the Soviet leader emphasized the superiority of offensive over defensive military planning.

Soviet mobilization and deployment in the period January-June 1941 took place in three stages:

  • first stage, January-March, the call-up of about a million reservists, industry ordered to step up production of T-34 and KV tanks, first echelon troops brought up to strength;
  • second stage, April-June, second echelon forces moved up to the western border, Far Eastern troops moved west;
  • third stage, June 1-June 22, Stalin agrees to open mobilization and to advancing second echelon armies to the front. All these operations were to be carried out in secrecy, without the enemy taking note. Once mobilized and in position, the Soviet forces were to launch a sudden, decisive offensive against Germany and her allies.

According to Meltiukhov, the correlation of forces along the front from Ostroleka (Poland) to the Carpathians at the time of the planned Zhukov offensive was as shown in the table below.

Red Army Wehrmacht Ratio
Divisions 128 55 2.3:1
Troop strength 3,400,000 1,400,000 2.1:1
Field guns 38,500 16,300 2.4:1
Tanks 7,500 900 8.7:1
Aircraft 6,200 1,400 4.4:1

The attack was to begin in typical blitzkrieg fashion — without warning, with air raids on enemy airfields, and with heavy artillery bombardment of front-line enemy forces. The USSR would thus have had the clear advantage of superior forces and the benefits of the first strike. Why Stalin did not give the order to attack is unknown.

In “Stalin’s Lost Opportunity,” Meltiukhov establishes, with meticulous documentation, that in the years 1938-40 the Soviet Union had carried out a massive build-up of military muscle that made it the superpower of the day, far exceeding the might of any enemy. Meltiukhov presents the comparative strength of the major belligerents for August 1939, on the eve of Germany’s invasion of Poland, as shown in the table above.

Accounting for Stalin’s Delay

Meltiukhov minces no words on Stalin’s intent: “The content of the Soviet operational plans, the ideological guidelines and the military propaganda, combined with information on the immediate military preparations of the Red Army for an offensive, attest unambiguously to the intention of the Soviet government to attack Germany in the summer of 1941.” He concludes that at first the opening strike against Germany (Operation Groza [Thunderstorm]) was scheduled for June 12, 1941, but that the Kremlin later fatefully shifted the date to July 15. According to Meltiukhov: “Unfortunately, what we now know today was a secret in 1941. The Soviet leadership made a fateful miscalculation by not striking first.”

Meltiukhov speculates that Stalin delayed the date for the attack when he learned, on May 12, of Rudolf Hess’ flight to Scotland. Stalin feared that if the Hess peace mission succeeded, and the British withdrew from the war, the Red Army would be left to stand alone against the Germans. When it became clear that the Hess mission had failed, Stalin set July 15 as the date for Operation Thunderstorm — 23 days after Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa. Had the Red Army attacked on the originally scheduled date, Meltiukhov believes, it would have succeeded.

Although Soviet intelligence had been informed of the precise date of the German attack by its agent Richard Sorge in Japan, and by its “Korsikanets” and “Starshina” sources in Berlin, Stalin refused to be convinced. Moreover, Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt had also warned Stalin, to no avail: Stalin knew that Britain desperately needed the USSR in the war against Germany for its own sake. By failing to strike first, as planned, the USSR lost 800,000 men (Germany, 80,000), 4,000 aircraft (Germany, 850), 21,500 field guns and 11,800 tanks (Germany, 400) during the first two and a half weeks of the war. By the end of 1941 the Soviet Union had lost three million Red Army troops.

Meltiukhov rejects the term “preventive war.” For a true preventive war, it is necessary for the attacker to know definitely that his adversary is about to invade. Meltiukhov maintains that, while the each side was aware of the other’s build-up and deployment of forces, neither the Germans nor the Russians knew with certainty that the other was about to attack. Stalin believed, with some logic, that Hitler would never open a second front while the Britain was still in the war, but the German leader chose not to wait until the Red Army launched its attack: he unleashed his own blitzkrieg.

The situation best resembles two cats sitting on a fence waiting to see which will jump off first. On the day before the attack, Hitler signaled his frame of mind in a letter to Mussolini: “Even if I were forced to lose 60-70 divisions in Russia by the end of the year, this would still only be a small fraction of the forces I would have to maintain constantly on the eastern border under the present conditions.” In the end Germany failed, Meltiukhov states, simply because it had neither the resources nor the reserves necessary to bring a long war to a successful conclusion.

A Suicidal Invasion?

The ever controversial, iconoclastic Suvorov dedicates his new book to his adversaries. He writes, “You can’t dedicate a book with this title [Ledokol, or “Suicide”] to friends, so I dedicate it to my enemies.” An enemy of the Soviet regime who defected to England, Suvorov was tried in absentia and sentenced to death. Although his opponents are legion, including many in the post-Soviet as well as the Anglo-American establishments, in today’s Russia he is the most popular writer on the history of the Second World War.

Suvorov joins Meltiukhov in the belief that if any side was unprepared for the war that ensued, it was the Germans. On June 22, 1941 when Germany launched its desperate attack, Stalin had some 13,000 aircraft to Hitler’s 2,500. Moreover, the Red Army had an even greater advantage in numbers and quality of tanks (24,000:3,700).

In “Suicide” Suvorov analyzes secondary sources in German, just as he did in his books on Russian war plans, and concludes that Hitler had lost the war even before the first shot was fired. It is Suvorov’s contention that Hitler and the Nazi leadership were irresponsible in launching a war against the much larger, better prepared, and better armed Soviet Union in the absurd belief that the USSR could be defeated in 90 days — July-August-September. Hitler and the German high command unpardonably underestimated the strength of the Soviet armed forces, which Stalin had been building up since the mid-1920s. Germany, of course, did not begin rearming until the mid-1930s, and would delay mobilizing for total war until around 1943.

Stalin and his advisors knew that the Wehrmacht lacked all the essentials for a protracted war under conditions of extreme cold. Through their intelligence services and agents, the Soviets had learned that: German tanks were inferior to their own in both quantity and quality; Germany was critically short of oil; Germany did not manufacture cold-resistant lubricants; the German forces had not been issued winter clothing; Germany was dependent for its war effort on the import of many raw materials; and much more.

Exasperated by the short-sighted, superficial German plan for victory in three months, Suvorov asks a few rhetorical questions: Did Hitler think that May followed October in Russia? Had he learned nothing from Napoleon’s campaign? Did he not know that, even if he reached Moscow, Russia would have continued the war from the Urals in the interior, far beyond the reach of German long-range bombers?

By the end of the fourth month of Barbarossa, the German economy was already groaning. Fritz Todt, chief of arms production, advised Hitler to arrange for an armistice. Large-scale German tank operations had to be curtailed for lack of fuel. The German panzer units, with their limited number of tanks, were often forced to cover long distances to quell unforeseen exigencies, thereby further exhausting fuel supplies. (Large-scale blitzkrieg operations, ensuring the greatest possible encirclement and bag of prisoners, require that the tanks moving out from one pincer proceed with minimum diversion in order to meet those jumping off from the other pincer, thereby closing the encirclement.)

Beyond the Propaganda

Suvorov’s list of villains is long indeed. Hitler, Goebbels, and the subservient German generals are castigated for their recklessness. But Suvorov’s venom is mostly directed at the Communist and post-Communist establishment, whose spokesmen continue to mouth the Party line. He ridicules and mocks what he considers the falsehoods, misconceptions, myths, and errors about the German-Russian war invented and circulated by the various Soviet and post-Soviet “scientific institutes,” including the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and the Institute of Military History, whose researchers have tried to dismiss Suvorov’s findings as “unscientific.”

Suvorov dismisses typical official Soviet sources for the war as specious propaganda devoid of hard facts or figures. The main message of the original six-volume History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-45, Suvorov contends, is that Nikita Khrushchev (under whose administration the work was compiled) won the war single-handedly. Suvorov goes on to observe that when the twelve-volume revised edition of this official history was written under Leonid Brezhnev, it was revised to show that it was actually Brezhnev who had won the Great Patriotic War.

Suvorov singles out the memoirs of Marshal Zhukov for special criticism. He hazards that these were probably written by Glavpur (the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army). Thus “Zhukov” writes that on June 22, 1941, the Germans enjoyed a 5-6:1 advantage over Soviet forces in field pieces, tanks and aircraft, when in fact the ratio was to Russia’s advantage.

Suvorov considers Stalin to have been Hitler’s superior in cleverness, rationality, emotional stability, international politics, cruelty, and blood-letting. Stalin was much better informed about German capabilities than Hitler was of Russian. Suvorov introduces a Russian adage to demean Hitler’s attempt to outwit Stalin: “Never try to trick a trickster.” The only reason for Hitler’s initial success, for Suvorov, was that Barbarossa was an entirely irrational decision, which the thoroughly logical Stalin could not possibly have anticipated. In the opinion of this reviewer, that was precisely why Hitler took the gamble. Suvorov’s Russian nativism shines forth when he writes: “Only a fool would consider defeating Russia! Only a complete idiot would ever think of defeating it in a three-month campaign!”

As brilliant as Suvorov has been in exposing the historical lies of the corrupt Communist and post-Communist regimes, even sympathetic readers must take issue with him on certain points. As with Heinrich Schliemann’s discovery of Troy, Suvorov’s findings may not satisfy the more professional historians in every detail — and some of them will be subject to revision.

Overrating Stalin

Occasionally Suvorov contradicts himself. For example, he argues that when Hitler turned his troops southward to Kiev before Moscow was taken, he all but lost the war. But elsewhere Suvorov recognizes that in war the best strategy is to defeat the enemy’s armed forces, not to take prestige cities. In fact the German forces turned south not so much to take Kiev as to destroy another Soviet army. The German generals, who after all had some experience in the conduct of war, were of course perfectly aware of the pointlessness of capturing large cities merely for trophy value. When the enemy’s armed forces are destroyed, his cities will fall on their own.

Only in the case of Stalingrad did the German invaders commit all their forces and energies to take a city — with disastrous results. The previous winter, after the failure to take Moscow, reason had prevailed and the Germans retreated to a more defensible line, where they were able to regroup and reinforce their armies. Without the help of the Finns, German forces were inadequate to take Leningrad, so they bypassed the city. But Hitler forbade any retreat from Stalingrad. Its capture had been aimed, among other things, at blocking oil shipments up the Volga north to the Soviets. The Wehrmacht was no less concerned to fuel its own war machine: it had secured the Crimea in order to protect its chief sources of petroleum, in Romania and Hungary, from Soviet air attack from that peninsula.

Suvorov’s excessive regard for Stalin’s leadership and his equally overdone criticism of Hitler’s ignores the fact that Germany nearly did defeat the Red Army. Had the United States, Great Britain, France, and other allies not supported Stalin with arms, trucks, provisions, and other necessities of war, the outcome might have been quite different. It must also be recalled that, throughout much of the long Russian-German conflict, Germany was compelled to divert 20-30 percent of its war effort to the Western front.

Suvorov’s main contention, that Stalin groomed Hitler to do his dirty work in Europe, is untenable. It gives far too much credit to the Soviet dictator. Germany never wanted a war in the west, let alone one against Britain. True, the Germans suspected France — especially under the government of Léon Blum’s popular front — of further mischief.

It must be recalled that Germany’s ill-fated attack on the Soviet Union followed several successive attempts at its encirclement by its enemies. In the 1930s British and French diplomacy had succeeded in surrounding her with hostile nations. Then came the attempted Scandinavian and Balkan encirclement, and finally that of the U.S.,UK, and USSR. With both Soviet and Western forces increasing in strength, Germany took a desperate gamble to break the ring, rather than wait until the Red Army seized the most opportune time to pounce. True, the gamble failed. Today’s Germany, however, is a prosperous country, much smaller than it might have wished, but the remnant of Stalin’s USSR, stripped of the Tsar’s empire, is not much more than an overgrown economic basket case.

Suvorov exaggerates Stalin’s “genius.” While it is true that he created a police state and built up the Red Army to superpower status, his armed forces failed miserably at the time they were most needed, June 1941. It is also true that Stalin dominated Churchill and Roosevelt, above all in the several conferences that determined postwar arrangements among the “Big Three,” but the Western leaders had cast themselves in the role of supplicants who needed the Red Army to contain and destroy Germany.

For all that, Suvorov has made a great contribution to correcting the history of the Second World War by dispelling, once and for all, the myth of a peace-loving Soviet Union invented by Communist propagandists and circulated in the West by their dupes and sympathizers.

Trusting Stalin

According to Gorodetsky’s version of the Soviet Union, the USSR planned only counter-attacks in defense of the homeland, and its leader, Stalin, was too trusting of Adolf Hitler. Gorodetsky completely ignores the Soviet Union’s military build-up from the 1930s until the outbreak of hostilities in 1941. The tens of thousands of advanced tanks and aircraft; the training of hundreds of thousands of paratroopers; the forward deployment of airfields, depots, and attack units on the eve of the attack in June 1941 are all hard evidence of Stalin’s real intentions.

The Israeli researcher has limited himself almost entirely to examining statements from official Soviet sources. For the most part, he ignores military analysts (whether Russian, German, or American), who are better equipped than he to evaluate military capabilities and designs. These researchers tend increasingly to agree with Suvorov.

Gorodetsky retains the stale support of the old Soviet establishment, while Suvorov has gained many post-Soviet adherents in recent years. While Gorodetsky is read mostly in England and the United States, erstwhile allies of Stalinist Russia, Suvorov is read widely in Russia and Germany, whose peoples experienced Stalin’s and Hitler’s war first hand.

No Room for Chivalry

In Stalin’s War of Extermination Joachim Hoffmann examines both the underlying causes and the ruthless execution of the war by Russians and Germans alike, in a thoroughly engrossing, systematic approach that is unsurpassed with respect to comprehensiveness, objectivity, and documentation. Hoffmann has made extensive use of interrogations of Soviet prisoners of war, ranging in rank from general to private, conducted by their German captors during the war. These interviews, combined with the traditional exploitation of open-source, unclassified literature and recently declassified materials, irrefutably dispel the myth of a peace-loving Soviet Union led by a trusting, pacific Joseph Stalin. Hoffmann’s research confirms conclusively that the Soviet Union was making final preparations for its own preemptive attack when the Wehrmacht struck.

Besides the POW interrogations, Hoffmann cites such military authorities as Dmitri Volkogonov, to the effect that Stalin needed only a few more weeks to bring his forces into complete battle readiness; Soviet military analyst Colonel Danilov, who agrees that the “vozhd” (commander) only needed a bit more time; and Colonel Karpov, who has written:

“In the early grayness of a May or June morning, thousands of our aircraft and tens of thousands of our guns would have dealt the blow against the densely concentrated German force, whose positions were known down to battalion level — a surprise even more inconceivable than the German attack on us.”

Hoffmann contends that war between these two mutually hostile, ideologically driven nations was inevitable: it was merely a question of which side would initiate hostilities. He reminds us that the First World War had brought Communism to power over the one sixth of the Earth’s surface that had been the Russian empire. A second world war, Lenin preached, would advance Communism throughout Europe. Stalin, Lenin’s faithful disciple in propagating Communism, acted from the outset of his rule to increase the USSR’s military might to that end. By 1941, the Red Army’s aircraft, tanks, and field artillery exceeded Germany’s by a factor of at least six to one in each category. In that year, the USSR’s paratroops and submarines, exclusively offensive forces, exceeded those of the rest of the world combined.

The main principles of Soviet military doctrine in the spring of 1941 were: 1) the Red Army is an offensive army; 2) war must always be fought on enemy territory, with minimum friendly losses and the total destruction of the enemy; 3) the working class in the enemy’s country is a potential ally and should be encouraged to rebel against its masters; and 4) war preparations must serve to ensure offensive capabilities.

So confident was Stalin of Soviet military superiority, Hoffmann asserts, that he doubted Germany would ever be foolish enough to attack, especially as long as Britain remained in the war. Dumbfounded at the German successes at the outset of Barbarossa, the Soviet dictator realized that he had underestimated Germany’s chances of defeating the Red Army. Suvorov has described Stalin’s probable state of mind as comparable to that of the designer of the Titanic after learning it had sunk. Nevertheless, vowing vengeance, still confident of ultimate victory, Stalin demanded the total extermination of the German invaders. On November 6, 1941, he declared:

“Well now, if the Germans want a war of extermination, they will get it. From now on it will be our task, the task of the peoples of the Soviet Union, the task of our fighters, commanders, and the political officials of our Army and Navy, to exterminate to the last man all Germans who have invaded the Homeland as occupiers. No mercy to the German occupiers! Death to the German occupiers!”

Hitler, for his part, by underestimating the military strength of the Soviet Union, led his country to a catastrophic defeat. Goebbels, in his diary, suggested that had Hitler known the actual strength of the Red Army, he might have at least paused before taking his fateful gamble. Yet, however disastrous the Axis attack finally proved for the German nation in the end, Hoffmann believes that all Europe would have suffered as grim a fate had the Red Army succeeded in striking first.

This clash to the death between two ideologically driven states, Hoffmann observes, left no room for chivalry, or for the strict observance of international conventions on land warfare. Stalin insisted that Soviet soldiers not surrender, and used maximal terror to prevent them from doing so. Soviet POWs were deemed deserters, and any Soviet soldier who surrendered was to be killed on falling into Soviet hands. (Near the end of the war German soldiers who refused to fight were shot and hanged from lamp posts for all to see.) Throughout the Great Patriotic War, as the Soviets dubbed it, “Soviet patriotism” and “mass heroism” were heavily dependent on terrorism. As Hoffmann writes, the head of Red Army Political Propaganda, Commissar Lev Sakharovich Mekhlis, was empowered by Stalin to use every device of terror to keep the Red Army fighting. This Mekhlis did with relish. In consequence of the activity of this and other commissars, Stalin’s terror against his own people (soldiers and civilians) during the war accounted for a substantial percentage of the estimated twenty-five million Soviet war dead. (See also Walter Sanning’s essay on Soviet losses, “Soviet Scorched-Earth Warfare,” in JHR [spring 1985]). Even so, more than five million Soviet soldiers managed to surrender to the invaders by the end of the war. Of those who survived the war, many had cause to wish they hadn’t following their repatriation to the USSR.

Unpunished Crimes, Aggressive Plans

From the onset of the war, German soldiers unfortunate enough to be taken prisoner were often mutilated and murdered. When the Soviet forces entered Germany, men and boys were murdered or drafted for forced labor; the women were often raped, sometimes murdered, and, if strong enough, dragooned for forced labor.

Although by about 1950 Stalin decided to lessen the influence of Jews in the Communist Party, Jews were very much involved in murderous assignments during the war. In addition to Mekhlis, there was Lazar Kaganovich, responsible for the deaths of millions; General Abakumov, who headed the NKVD/MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs, or secret police), and Generals Reichman and Chernyakhovski, who were especially ruthless. Hoffmann hastens to add that the criminal actions of individual Jews should no more reflect on the Jewish people as a whole than the criminal actions of individual Nazis on the German people. Yet Nazis charged with war crimes have been, and continue to be, tried and punished, while, curiously, no courts appear to be interested in bringing Communist criminals to justice.

The thoroughness and reliability of Hoffmann’s work (which helpfully includes an appendix containing key original documents in Polish, Russian, English, and German) is nicely exemplified in his treatment of Zhukov’s plan of May 15, 1941. While Sergeyev and Bezymenski seem to suggest that the plan was only recently discovered, Hoffmann makes manifestly clear that the plan has long been known and analyzed. Colonel Valeri Danilov and Dr. Heinz Magenheimer examined this plan and other documents that indicate Soviet preparations for attack almost ten years ago in an Austrian military journal (Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, nos. 5 and 6, 1991; no. 1, 1993; and no. 1, 1994). Both researchers concluded that the Zhukov plan of May 15, 1941, reflected Stalin’s May 5, 1941 speech (see above) heralding the birth of the new offensive Red Army. Hoffmann reproduces an original document, referred to as “Short Notation of Comrade Stalin’s Speech to the Red Army Academy on May 5, 1941,” which concludes with the words:

“But now that we have reconstructed our army and abundantly saturated it with the technology to wage modern warfare, now that we have become strong — now we are obliged to go from defense to attack. In defending our country we are obliged to act in an offensive manner. To switch over from defense to a military policy of offensive action. We must reconstruct our training, our propaganda, our agitation, and our press in the spirit of attack. The Red Army is now a modern army, and a modern army is an army of attack.”

The Zhukov plan of May 15, 1941, indicates clearly that the Red Army planned a preemptive strike against the German forces across the border. Hoffmann further notes that a few days later, on May 20, 1941, Mikhail Kalinin, then chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet and nominally head of state, gave a speech in which he said:

“War is a very dangerous business, laden with sorrows, but when a time comes when it is possible to expand the realm of Communism, war should not be discounted … and the zone of Communism must be expanded. The capitalist world can only be destroyed by the red hot glowing steel of a holy revolutionary war.”

Kalinin thus strongly implied that the war the USSR was about to wage was not a preventive war forced upon it by Germany, but a war of conquest to expand the Communist empire.

The Perfect Storm

The preponderance of documents uncovered in the past decade, including further analyses of the Zhukov plan of May 15, 1941, by members of the Suvorov school, should convince the impartial reader that: Germany was woefully unprepared for a long war; that the Soviet Union was not only armed to the teeth, but poised to spring in July 1941; that Stalin was Lenin’s disciple in striving to advance Communism to the rest of Europe, especially to Germany; and that the governments of Britain and France were totally oblivious of the greater danger Communism posed to them when they declared war on Germany over its border dispute with Poland.The failure of the British, French, and American leaderships to perceive that the Soviet Union was by far the deadlier threat, even in 1939, was a mistake that has taken half a century to rectify, at the cost of countless millions of lives.

Hoffmann concludes that the war between the two irreconcilable ideologies was inevitable and unavoidable. Stalin’s fanatical adherence to Communism (class hatred) and Hitler’s equally fanatical adherence to racial theories (Hoffmann cites Disraeli: “The race question is the key to world history”) led their peoples to a catastrophe unmatched since the Thirty Years’ War. Hoffmann blames the horrible excesses the Red Army inflicted on German civilians on hate-obsessed war propagandists such as Ilya Ehrenburg in Russia who deliberately exaggerated German crimes. Thus, Hoffman notes, Ehrenburg announced a death toll of four million for Auschwitz on January 4, 1945, weeks before the capture of the camp. Likewise, months before the war’s end, Ehrenburg reported that six million Jews had been murdered by the Germans. Moreover, in many instances, including the infamous Katyn forest massacre of Polish prisoners, Red propagandists shamelessly tried to blame the German army for crimes committed by the Soviets.

Like his colleague Wolfgang Strauss, Hoffmann advocates reconciliation between the peoples of Germany and Russia. The policies of both Stalin’s Communist regime and Hitler’s National Socialist state were aberrations far removed from the traditional friendship between the two peoples as prevailed under Bismarck and before him. In that spirit Hoffmann makes special mention of Drs. Heinz Magenheimer, Werner Maser, Ernst Topitsch, Günther Gillessen, Alfred M. de Zayas, Viktor Suvorov, and also Aleksandr Moiseevich Nekrich and Lev Kopelev, two former Soviet wartime commissars of Jewish extraction, for their courageous contributions to revisionist history. (Nor has Hoffmann been less than courageous: he testified in a German court to the scholarly quality of Germar Rudolf ‘s Holocaust revisionist anthology, Grundlagen zur Zeitgeschichte, later published in English as Dissecting the Holocaust.)

The extreme economic and political conditions that afflicted much of the first half of the twentieth century devastated Germany and Russia. The slaughter of the First World War, the triumph of Communism in Russia, the treaty of Versailles, and the Great Depression combined to culminate in the political storm of the century, the Second World War, much as unique and unforeseen meteorological conditions in October 1991 — three merging hurricanes — combined to create what writer Sebastian Junger called “the perfect storm,” a devastating “nor’easter” in the North Atlantic. In historians such as Suvorov and Hoffmann, the historical tempest of the twentieth century is, increasingly, finding able and objective chroniclers.

About the Author

Daniel W. Michaels is a Columbia University graduate (Phi Beta Kappa, 1954) and a Fulbright exchange student to Germany (1957). Now retired after 40 years of service with the U.S. Department of Defense, he writes from his home in Washington, DC.

From The Journal of Historical Review, Sept.-Dec. 2001 (Vol. 20, No. 5-6), pp. 59 ff.



October 26, 2014

Barbaramente assassinato dalle Demonocrazie Occidentali circa 3 anni fa.



La Libia nel 2011 presentava i seguenti livelli di Stato sociale:

 Indennità di disoccupazione: 730$ mensili (in Libia la vita costa 1/3 rispetto all’Italia)
 Pil procapite: 14.192$
 Rapporto debito/PIL: 33% (secondo il sito della CIA al 2010 è il Paese meno indebitato al mondo)
 Ogni membro di una famiglia riceve dallo Stato 1000$ annuali
 Per ogni nuovo nato lo Stato dona alla famiglia 7000$
 Gli sposi ricevono 64.000$ per l’acquisto di una casa
 Istruzione e università all’estero a carico dello Stato
 Prezzi simbolici dei prodotti alimentari di base per le famiglie numerose
 Erogazione gratuita di prodotti medicinali e farmaceutici
 Costo di 1 litro di benzina 0,14$, dunque è più economica dell’acqua
 Energia elettrica gratuita
 All’apertura di un’attività personale si riceve un finanziamento statale di 20.000$
 Per l’acquisto di una vettura il 50% è versato dallo Stato
 Prestiti per l’acquisto di un’ auto o di una casa senza alcun interesse
 Imposte e tasse extra proibite.

Confrontateli con quello che oggi e’ la Libia. Anzi, confrontateli con i livelli di Stato sociale del vostro Paese, OVUNQUE voi viviate!

Un vero tiranno, eh? Dove si firma per essere oppressi in tal modo?


October 26, 2014

Caro Nord, va a dar via el cul!

Il Sud e L’Unita’ d’Italia          Intervista a Re Ferdinando

Viva   ‘o   Rre!!!



October 26, 2014

Popular Monarchy, the call for a traditional Russian state adapted to contemporary challenges, was an articulation of the ancient ideal of a just Christian realm by White emigre thinker Ivan Solonevich (1891-1953). Like the French counter-revolutionaries, Solonevich understood that an aristocracy diverted from its original purpose, valiant service, would only come to destroy the achievements of the nation. Knowing the terrible experience of the Revolution and its roots in the decadence, abuses, and godlessness of the elites, he points the way toward an organic unity of the people and their Tsar, called alike to glorify God on earth as in heaven. Translated by Mark Hackard.   (LINK)

Russian monarchical authority, beginning with the death of Peter the Great and ending with the overthrow of Emperor Nicholas II, was always in an extremely unstable position. This instability was caused by that objectively given political situation that Vasily Klyuchevsky characterized as the monarchy and masses’ drive to “democratic autocracy,” the monarchy’s technical reliance on the aristocratic element, and its own struggle with this element. However, the Muscovite monarchy, directly appealing to the “democratic” element – in particular the population of Moscow – succeeded in dealing with the country’s aristocratic circles. Precisely for this reason the capital was transferred to St. Petersburg and the throne isolated from the “masses.” The throne came to be at the disposal of the “palace guard.” And from the murder of Aleksei Petrovich; through the murder of Paul; the revolt of the Decembrists; the assassination of Alexander II; and the dethronement of Nicholas II, the Russian nobility attempted to halt the development of the Russian monarchy towards democratic autocracy. Not once did the Russian demos, the Russian people, ever rise up against the monarchy. The coup d’état of 1917 was the result of a palace conspiracy technically composed by the Russian military brass. In the February Revolution, our revolutionaries were decisively useless – not only had they not prepared this revolution, but they didn’t have any notion that it was drawing near.

The “palace coup” grew into a “revolution” only when the complete absence of any points of support whatsoever for the generals and aristocracy among the masses became clear, as well as the absence of any sort of popularity among the army and people. The men who organized this takeover thought they were “shining with their own light,” but this was only the reflected light of the monarchy. The monarchy was extinguished, and so were they.

March 13th, 1613. The Land Assembly of the people chooses Mikhail Fyodorovich Romanov as Tsar.

From Peter the Great to Nicholas II, the Monarchy was deprived of that “system of institutions” of which Lev Tikhomirov spoke, and this system was replaced by a “barrier between the Tsar and the People.” The state assemblies [Dumas] of all four convocations were only one of the types of this division: they reflected the opinions of parties, but not of the Land.

In an environment where only One Man in the entire ruling class of the country – only the monarch and he alone – expressed through himself the basic aspirations of the popular masses, the idea of removing the monarch to change the course of history was politically too tempting. This enjoyed success in the murder of Tsarevich Aleksei Petrovich, an act that cleared the way for the serfdom of the peasantry. It was also a success with the killing of Tsar Paul, which delayed the liquidation of serfdom. The Decembrists did not succeed, but the assassins of the Tsar-Liberator did, by their murder interrupting Russia’s return to the principles of Muscovite Rus.

In Muscovite Rus, acts of regicide would have first of all been pointless, for the Tsar’s authority was only one of the components of a “system of institutions,” and they system could not be changed by the murder of one of its components. According to Aksakov: to the Tsar belonged the force of authority, and to the people the force of opinion. Or according to Lev Tikhomirov: monarchy derived “not from the arbitrary rule of one person, but from a system of institutions.” By the force of authority, the Muscovite Tsars realized the opinion of the Land. This opinion, organized into the Church, into ecclesiastical councils and Assemblies of the Land, and in its unorganized form represented by the population of Moscow, did not change over a regicide. Assemblies never claimed power (a completely incomprehensible phenomenon from the European point of view), and Tsars never went against the “opinion of the Land,” a phenomenon of a purely Russian order. Behind the monarchy stood an entire “system of institutions,” and all of this taken together presented itself as a monolith impossible to shatter through any regicide.

Therefore the Popular-Monarchist Movement sees in the “restoration of monarchy” not only the “restoration of the monarch,” but also a whole system of institutions from the Throne of All the Russias to the village assembly. It would be that system in which the force of authority belonged to the Tsar and the force of opinion to the people.  This cannot be achieved by any “written laws” or “constitution,” for both written laws and constitutions are followed by men only until that time when they gain the strength to NOT follow them. The Popular-Monarchist Movement is not engaged in publishing the laws of a future Russian Empire. It attempts to establish basic principles and ideationally compose the country’s future ruling class, which would be equally devoted to the Tsar and the people, a ruling class organized into a system of institutions to realize these principles in practice and truly become the bulwark of the throne, not visitors to prayer services who conceal in their boots the daggers of regicide.

The main problem of restoring a stable monarchy is found in the organization of this class. And because in internal struggles no class of the nation ever acts from purely altruistic motives, this class should be set in conditions under which its freedom of action would coincide with the real interests of the country, while attempts at overthrow would be punished in the legislative and judicial order with the most ruthless severity.

A system of monarchical institutions should begin from territorial and professional self-government (land councils, municipalities, trade unions) and end in central representation composed according to the same territorial and professional principle rather than by parties. The Russian monarchy can be restored only by the will of the people and nothing else. If this will shall be monarchical, then its local organs shall also be monarchical. The purely technical task consists of ensuring that no “barriers” arise – class, bureaucratic, party, or any others. The technical apparatus of the Petersburg monarchy was organized in a way glaringly unsatisfactory. It could not even manage tasks such as the personal protection of the Tsar. It left a yawing emptiness between the throne and the nation. Instead of a businesslike staff that was the retinue of the Muscovite Tsars, the Petersburg monarchy was surrounded by a “court” made up of idlers.

Tsar Nicholas II's farewell to his Cossack bodyguard. By Pavel Ryzhenko.

In the terrible days of Pskov, Emperor Nicholas II came to be in absolute isolation, betrayed by his court, his generals, the Duma, the government – finding himself in the Pskov trap and having no physical possibility of addressing the people or the army. The restoration of this system would mean restoring the tradition of regicide and suicide.

The Russian monarchy of the Petersburg period tried to become popular, stable and of full value; it did not succeed. The forces of division removed or attempted to remove the best monarchs, just as they did with their best deputies (M.M. Speransky and P.A. Stolypin). Now this same group has ended its life in regicide and suicide. It represents a certain propaganda danger against the restoration of the monarchy, but after restoration it represents absolutely none. Instead of this, with a great degree of clarity, there appears before the future Russia the danger of bureaucracy.

The reality of this danger consists of the fact that today’s ruling class is in essence almost purely bureaucracy. In all ballots, both empire-wide and local, this class will vote for that party guaranteeing as great a quantity of “sinecures,” “services,” “posts,” and power. It will vote against any party relying on private and local initiative. And it will be a class that will manifest maximum political activity, just as this has already happened in emigration, for any functional property is daily bread for this class, and any attempt to affirm the rights of private initiative will be an attempt to take it away.


October 25, 2014

Visi Latvijas (un Eiropas) politiķi un inteliģenti, mediju pārstāvji un nozombētie no tautas vidus, kas atbalsta Ukrainas huntas masu slepkavības, ir šo noziegumu līdzdalībnieki.   (LINK)


Kas Patiesībā Notiek Doņeckā

Aculiecinieka stāsts
Šī gada 28. septembrī mūsu spīkeris Einārs Graudiņš apmeklēja Doņeckas Tautas Republiku starptautiskās komisijas sastāvā, kuras uzdevums ir tur pastrādāto noziegumu izmeklēšana. Atgriezies no Doņeckas, viņš pastāstīja, ko redzējis un dzirdējis. Cilvēkiem ar jutīgu nervu sistēmu tālāko lasīt nav ieteicams.
Pēc Doņeckas Tautas Republikas pārstāvju ielūguma es kopā ar citiem tiesībsargiem no Eiropas (Francijas, Anglijas, Igaunijas un Bulgārijas), kā arī no Krievijas, ko pārstāvēja Maskavas cilvēktiesību biroja direktors Aleksandrs Brods, apmeklēju Doņeckas Tautas Republiku. Pabiju Doņeckas pilsētā, kur tikos ar republikas valdības pārstāvjiem, bet pēc tam apmeklēju divas masveida apbedījumu vietas: šahtu Komunarskaja Nr. 22 un ciemu Ņižņaja Krinka.Ar Doņeckas Tautas republikas valdības pārstāvjiem ciemā Ņižņaja Krinka.Centīšos aprakstīt reālo situāciju, jo Rietumu, Baltijas mēdijos, un Krievijas izdevumos informācija tiek atspoguļota atšķirīgi, tāpēc ir grūti izprast, kur — patiesība, kur — meli.
Situācija ir ļoti smaga un bīstama. Doņeckā faktiski nav medikamentu, gandrīz nav nekādu iespēju veikt operāciju, jo nav narkozei nepieciešamo līdzekļu. Tā ir milzīga problēma.
Doņeckā nav trakumsērgas potēm nepieciešamo līdzekļu. Pamesto mājdzīvnieku, piemēram, suņu skaits pašlaik ir ļoti liels. Viņu saimnieki ir bijuši spiesti doties bēgļa gaitās vai gājuši bojā. Šī iemesla dēļ pastāv trakumsērgas epidēmijas risks.
Valsts dienestu darbs, kas izmanto Ukrainas vienotos reģistrus, Doņeckas Tautas Republikā ir pilnībā paralizēts. Tas nozīmē, ka nav iespējams veikt darījumus ar nekustamo īpašumu un reģistrēt civilstāvokļa aktus. Situācija Ukrainā ir visai specifiska: lieta tāda, ka visi valsts reģistri tiek glabāti serveros Kijevā, savukārt Kijevas varas iestādes Doņeckas republikai ir pilnībā liegušas pieeju šīm datu bāzēm. Rezultātā Doņeckā sācies totāls administratīvais kolapss, un pašlaik nav nekādu iespēju atjaunot valsts dienestu darbu.
Banku sistēma nedarbojas, bezskaidrās naudas darījumi nenotiek, nefunkcionē sistēma SWIFT. Tātad cilvēkiem, kas saņem algas no budžeta (skolotājiem, ārstiem), un pensionāriem skaidrā nauda tiek vesta uz mājām vai izsniegta darba vietā.
Skolas bija spiestas sākt darbu 1. oktobrī, jo 1. septembrī tas izrādījās neiespējami.
Tālā darbības rādiusa aviācija un zalves uguns reaktīvās sistēmas „GRAD” plānveidīgi iznīcina pilsētu. 28. septembrī, laikā, kad apmeklēju pilsētu, notika apšaude. Jāpiebilst, ka Kijevas valdība pieturas pie iedzīvotāju iebiedēšanas stratēģijas. Apšaude ir haotiska, tai pakļauti arī dzīvojamie rajoni. Neviens Doņeckas iedzīvotājs nezina, vai viņa ģimene vakarā vēl būs dzīva — lādiņš trāpīs viņu mājā vai aizlidos garām.
Pašlaik Doņeckas morgos atrodas 400 neidentificētu līķu. Iespējams, bojā gājusi visa ģimene, un nav neviena, kas varētu šos cilvēkus identificēt, vai līķis jau ir tiktāl sadalījies, ka to identificēt nav iespējams, vai viņa radi ir pametuši valsti un devušies, piemēram, uz Krieviju.
DNS ekspertīze sagādā lielas grūtības — jūtams medicīnisko un administratīvo resursu trūkums, jo paraugi identificēšanai ir jāpaņem no radiem. Tas prasa milzu pūles un pietiekamu tiesu medicīnas ekspertu skaitu. Lai varētu veikt šo darbu pietiekamā apjomā trūkst speciālistu.
Vēl viena problēma — pilsētas rūpnieciskās un kultūras infrastruktūras mērķtiecīga iznīcināšana no Ukrainas varas pārstāvju puses. Doņeckā bija Novadpētniecības muzejs. Tam nebija nekādas militārās nozīmes, taču ēka ir sagrauta līdz pamatiem.
Jāpiemin vēl viens piemērs, kas attiecas uz rūpniecības infrastruktūru. Pilsētā tika mērķtiecīgi iznīcinātas 300 elektroenerģijas piegādes apakšstacijas, kam ir liela nozīme pilsētas elektroapgādes sistēmā. Diversanti uzstādīja šajās stacijās radiobākas, un pēc tam tālšāvēja artilērija apšaudīja transformatoru būdas.
Doņeckā atradās unikāla rūpnīca, kurā tika izgatavoti augstsprieguma līniju izolatori. Produkcija bija īpaši pieprasīta ārvalstīs. Tā ir tehnoloģiski attīstīta un sarežģīta ražotne, ko nav iespējams organizēt vienas dienas laikā. Rūpnīcā tika ražotas konkurētspējīgas eksporta preces. Tagad pēc mērķtiecīgas bombardēšanas un apšaudes rūpnīca ir pilnībā iznīcināta — tur vairs nekā nav.
Visus noziegumus pret civiliedzīvotājiem izmeklē Doņeckas Republikas IeM, prokuratūra un izmeklēšanas orgāni. Vizītes laikā tikos ar iekšlietu ministru, prokuroru un Augstākās tiesas pārstāvjiem. Viņi cenšas dokumentēt visus faktus, taču zināmi ierobežojumi arī ir, piemēram, personāla trūkums, tāpēc šo darbu nav iespējams veikt pilnā apjomā.
Tiesībsargājošo orgānu darbinieki man pastāstīja, ka viņu pusē ir pārgājuši vairāki izmeklētāji no Mariupoles. Tagad viņi turpina dienestu Doņeckā. Šie cilvēki pārgāja Doņeckas pusē, jo nespēja izturēt līdzās esošajos kabinetos spīdzināto cilvēku kliedzienus, kas skanēja caurām diennaktīm. No turienes tika nesti ārā līķi un vilkti iekšā bezsamaņā esoši cilvēki. Tādas metodes izmanto Ukrainas tiesībsargājošie orgāni — tas ir reāls, patiess fakts.
Ko arestē Ukrainas tiesībsargājošo orgānu darbinieki? Gandrīz visus. Viņi var arestēt mašīnrakstītāju vai stenogrāfisti, kas piedalījusies referenduma sagatavošanas darbos. Aizturēti tiek visi ar zemessardzi saistītie cilvēki, zemessargu radinieki. Doņeckas Republikā jau darbojas sava apbalvojumu sistēma, un es vairākkārt jautāju, vai drīkstu fotografēt. Man atbildēja, ka varu fotografēt ko vien vēlos, galvenais — lai nebūtu redzama seja. Ja uzzinās, ka cilvēks ir iestājies zemessardzē, viņa tuviniekiem nav iespējams garantēt drošību. Vēl vairāk — viņi nevar būt droši pat par savu dzīvību.

Doņeckas Republikā jau darbojas sava apbalvojumu sistēma, bet apbalvoti zemessargi neļaju bildēt sejas.

Dažus vārdus jāsaka arī par masveida apbedījumu vietām. Viena no tām ir šahtā Komunarskaja. Kad tur ierados, līķi jau bija izvesti, jo tos nebija iespējams saglabāt — 28. septembrī gaisa temperatūra sasniedza plus 22 grādi.

Šahta Komurskaja. Pie apbedījuma vietas.

Taču to, ka apbedījumi tur ir bijuši, jau ir apstiprinājušas starptautiskās komisijas, kas šo vietu apmeklēja pirms mums. Iespēja, ka visu ir organizējuši paši zemessargi, ir izslēgta. Mēs tikāmies ar sievieti, kuras dēla līķis tika atrasts šajā šahtā. Viņa dzīvo netālajā Komunarskas ciemā. Šī sieviete precīzi pastāstīja, kā tika aizturēts un pēc tam nogalināts viņas dēls.

Šī sieviete precīzi pastāstīja, kā tika aizturēts un pēc tam nogalināts viņas dēls.

Tātad inscenējums ir izslēgts. Šie masveida apbedījumi ir saistīti tikai ar soda bataljonu darbību, kuru rokām tiek realizēti Kijevas politiskie mērķi.
Šīs soda nodaļas ir specifiskas bandas, kas nepakļaujas nevienam. Mums paskaidroja, ka tikai 25% soda bataljonu kaujinieku atrodas Ukrainas IeM pakļautībā. To, kas veido pārējos 75% kaujinieku nezina neviens — ne to, kas ir šie cilvēki, ne arī to, ar ko viņi nodarbojas. Sakaru soda bataljonu starpā nav, taču viņi pilda noteiktas policijas un soda vienību funkcijas.
Kāds viņiem sakars ar Ukrainas regulāro armiju? Vietējie iedzīvotāji stāsta, ka vispirms esot ieradušies regulārās armijas spēki (tie ir armijā iesauktie kareivji, 18 — 19 gadus veci puiši). Nekādas īpašas simpātijas pret vietējiem viņi neizrādīja, taču terora nebija, tāpēc armijnieki un civiliedzīvotāji mierīgi sadzīvoja. Pēc tam ieradās soda bataljoni, un tajā pašā dienā sākās izvarošanas, laupīšanas, sāka pazust cilvēki.
Doņeckas Republikā Ukrainas pasts nedarbojas, taču pasta sistēma strādā relatīvās robežas otrā pusē. Vietējie iedzīvotaji stāstīja, kādās rindās stāvējuši soda bataljonu kaujinieki, kuri vienu pēc otras sūtīja uz mājām pakas ar salaupītajām mantām.

Robežsardzes punkts starp Krievijas Federāciju un Doņeckas Tautas republiku.

Atkāpjoties no pozīcijām, viņi iznīcina infrastruktūru. Piemēram, ciemā Ņižņaja Krinka, ko apmeklēju, bija uzspridzināts tilts un nodedzinātas dzīvojamās mājas. Mājas nebija cietušas karadarbības gaitā, tās bija sadedzinātas tīšām. Tādas pašas metodes Otrā pasaules kara laikā Baltkrievijā izmantoja esesieši.
Kas notiek? Vispirms tiek izlaupītas, pēc tam — nodedzinātas mājas. Vēl viens fakts: visur, kur rīkojas bandas, fiksēti daudzkārtējas sieviešu un meiteņu grupveida izvarošanas gadījumi.

Atkāpjoties no pozīcijām, soda bataljoni iznīcina infrastruktūru. Piemēram, ciemā Ņižņaja Krinka bija nodedzinātas dzīvojamās mājas. 

Starptautisko tiesībsargājošo organizāciju uzmanību pašlaik ir piesaistījuši ārpustiesas izrēķināšanās, spīdzināšanas un sagūstīto zemessargu slepkavošanas gadījumi, taču varu droši apgalvot, ka paralēli pastrādāti daudzi noziegumi, kam netiek veltīta pienācīga vērība. Vietējie iedzīvotāji jau ir novesti līdz tādam stāvoklim, ka priecājas par to, ka palikuši dzīvi.

Vietējie iedzīvotāji jau ir novesti līdz tādam stāvoklim, ka priecājas par to, ka palikuši dzīvi.

Man stāstīja arī par tādiem gadījumiem. Ir kāda apdzīvota vieta — Ždanovka. Pirms iebrukuma soda nodaļas vispirms noskaidroja to cilvēku uzvārdus, kas tika iesaukti Ukrainas armijā un neieradās iesaukuma punktā. Tika atrasti 15 puiši. Viņi tika nošauti bez tiesas un izmeklēšanas.
Vēl viens piemērs: mašīnā brauca vīrs un sieva. Soda bataljona kaujiniekiem iepatikās viņu mašīna. Dzīvesbiedri tika nošauti. Viņu līķus kaujinieki iemeta upē un aizbrauca viņu mašīnā.
Lūk, kā darbojas soda nodaļas. Piedevām viņi mīnē apbedījumu vietas, tāpēc, piemēram, Ņižņaja Krinkā, kur pagaidām atrasta tikai viena apbedījumu vieta, vēl nav zināms, kādi būs izrakumu rezultāti, kas tiks atrasts. Netālu ir kāds lauks, kurā jūtama spēcīga līķu smaka. Šajā laukā meklējumi vēl nav uzsākti, jo to nav pārbaudījuši sapieri, taču, domājams, gaidāmi jauni baismīgi atklājumi, jo liels skaits cilvēku tiek uzskatīti par pazudušiem bez vēsts.

Ņižņaja Krinkā, kur pagaidām atrasta tikai viena apbedījumu vieta, vēl nav zināms, kādi būs izrakumu rezultāti, kas tiks atrasts.

Tāda īsumā pašlaik ir situācija Doņeckas Tautas Republikā. To visu esmu skatījis pats savām acīm un varu pastāstīt bez jebkādiem aizspriedumiem.

Einārs Graudiņš


And this is how it looks like, after the murderous attacks on helpless civilians. Multiply what you see for a thousand times and you’ll have the whole picture. This is what European governments support today. It’s demonocracy, baby!

Ah, before I forget…. this mass murder was committed during the current ceasefire. Go figure! 


October 24, 2014

H/T   The Saker           Trascrizione in Italiano

P.S. = Nowadays a reporter is either unemployed or a prostitute.


October 24, 2014

Il giorno dopo aver vinto il Premio Nobel per la Pace venerdì scorso, Kailash Satyarthi, in un’intervista a RIA News, ha esortato il governo ucraino a proteggere i cittadini ucraini e soprattutto i bambini: “È responsabilità del governo ucraino salvare i propri cittadini, in particolare i bambini. La sicurezza dei bambini sarà la loro massima priorità. Mi appello al governo ucraino in modo da garantire che tali incidenti contro i bambini non si verifichino in futuro”.

Secondo il recente rapporto delle Nazioni Unite, ben 3.660 persone sono state uccise e più di 8.756 sono state ferite in Donbass da quando Kiev ha lanciato la sua operazione militare nel mese di aprile. Anche se un cessate il fuoco è stato annunciato il 5 settembre, più di 330 persone sono morte da quel momento, tra cui 20 bambini. L’UNICEF ha dichiarato che almeno 35 bambini sono stati uccisi nel conflitto ucraino e 87 sono stati feriti.

Lei non è sopravvissuta

Human Rights Watch ha già invitato i sostenitori internazionali dell’Ucraina a “sollecitare il governo ucraino a rispettare rigorosamente il diritto internazionale umanitario, compresa la fine di qualsiasi utilizzo da parte dell’esercito ucraino di razzi Grad in zone popolate”.

Anche Amnesty International ha esortato il governo ucraino a “fermare gli abusi e i crimini di guerra da parte dei battaglioni di volontari che operano a fianco delle regolari forze armate ucraine”, come Aidar. Tutti questi appelli, esortazioni e inviti rischiano di restare voci che gridano nel deserto.

In primo luogo, Kiev nega ripetutamente la responsabilità per i crimini di guerra, anche quando è dimostrato da osservatori indipendenti che l’esercito ucraino ha effettuato le atrocità; per esempio, l’OSCE ha confermato che il 2 giugno l’aviazione ucraina ha bombardato un edificio pubblico a Lugansk, uccidendo 8 civili – Kiev ha sostenuto che i separatisti hanno usato male un sistema missilistico antiaereo portatile.

Kailash Satyarthi, attivista per i diritti dei bambini, è stato insignito del Premio Nobel per la pace lo scorso venerdì. Una delle sue prime dichiarazioni pubbliche, il giorno successivo, è stata quella di richiamare il governo di Kiev per i suoi brutali attacchi sui bambini in Ucraina orientale.

In secondo luogo, anche se il governo continua a dare la colpa ai ‘ribelli’, non sembra essere motivato ​​ quando si tratta di indagare questi crimini. Inoltre, anche le organizzazioni internazionali sembrano non essere così entusiaste di scoprire eventuali nuove atrocità. Per esempio, l’ONU ha promesso di indagare sulle denunce di fosse comuni nelle zone vicino a Donetsk, che sono state controllate dall’esercito ucraino, ma quando il rapporto è venuto fuori il problema delle fosse comuni è stato volutamente omesso.

In terzo luogo, dopo la relazione speciale della Reuters di questa settimana sui difetti trovati nell’indagine fatta dall’Ucraina del massacro di Maidan, ci sono molte ragioni per credere che, anche se Kiev ha deciso di svolgere indagini dei crimini, è improbabile che queste possano essere imparziali e giuste.

C’è stata molta pressione da parte degli attivisti di Maidan per indagare sulle uccisioni di 100 manifestanti a febbraio, per le quali i nuovi leader si sono affrettati a dare la colpa alla Berkut (le forze speciali della polizia). Hanno anche arrestato tre sospetti.

Tuttavia, la Reuters ha scoperto alcuni notevoli errori:

Tra le prove presentate contro Sadovnyk (uno dei sospetti arrestati) c’è una fotografia. I procuratori dicono che lo mostra vicino a Piazza Indipendenza a Kiev il 20 febbraio, mentre indossa una maschera e tiene un fucile con due mani, le dita ben visibile. Il problema: Sadovnyk non ha due mani. La sua mano destra, ha detto la moglie alla Reuters, è stata spazzata via da una granata in un incidente in allenamento sei anni fa.

Una stanza della scuola bombardata in Ucraina orientale ai primi di ottobre. Un insegnante e due genitori sono stati uccisi. 70 bambini erano nella scuola quando è stata colpita.

Un altro problema enorme che Reuters ha scoperto:

I due pubblici ministeri e un ministro del governo che hanno guidato le indagini sulle sparatorie del Maidan hanno avuto tutti un ruolo nel sostenere la rivolta. Uno di questi funzionari ha detto a Reuters che gli investigatori che stanno raccogliendo gli elementi di prova sono completamente indipendenti.


l’ex procuratore generale che ha curato gli arresti dei tre ufficiali della Berkut ha dichiarato in televisione che “è già stato dimostrato che sono colpevoli”. Tale dichiarazione, hanno detto gli esperti legali, potrebbe pregiudicare i casi. L’Ucraina è parte contraente della Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo, in cui si afferma che gli imputati di crimini sono presunti innocenti fino a prova contraria.

Inutile dire che fino a oggi nessuno è stato arrestato nella sparatoria contro i poliziotti della Berkut. Tra il 18 e 20 febbraio, 189 di loro hanno sofferto ferite da arma da fuoco e 13 sono morti.

Una vittima dei bombardamenti ucraini con la sua bambina. Il bombardamento intenzionale di civili è stato implacabile.

In un tale contesto, nessuno dei 3.360 morti nell’Ucraina orientale e le loro famiglie, comprese le vittime del massacro di Odessa, può aspettarsi giustizia da parte del governo ucraino. È chiaro che senza la pressione della comunità internazionale e di altre organizzazioni, il regime di Kiev non cercherà di fermare l’esercito ucraino e altri battaglioni dal commettere crimini di guerra, né ha intenzione di indagare su di loro.

Senza dubbio, tutte le parti coinvolte farebbero maggiori sforzi per non commettere atrocità, come bersagliare le scuole, se ci fosse un serio rischio di essere incriminati per crimini di guerra da parte di un tribunale riconosciuto, ma anche la Corte penale internazionale (CPI) ha ignorato le persone che sono morte nelle sparatorie dei cecchini sul Maidan, le vittime del massacro di Odessa e altri civili morti per bombardamenti indiscriminati.

La Russia è l’unico paese che sta prendendo misure concrete per portare giustizia alle vittime dell’Ucraina orientale. Mosca ha invitato l’Organizzazione per la Sicurezza e la Cooperazione in Europa (OSCE) ad assumersi la responsabilità delle indagini sui crimini commessi in Ucraina. La Camera civica della Federazione russa ha presentato 30 petizioni alla Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo per crimini di guerra in Ucraina e ne presenterà diverse altre centinaia entro la fine dell’anno. Dieci petizioni sono state già rifiutate.

Infine, come avvocato per i diritti umani, il dott. Jonathan Levy, avvocato e membro della International Criminal Bar, ha scritto nella sua analisi giuridica indipendente: la Novorossija ‘deve portare alla giustizia i criminali di guerra di Kiev’. Secondo lui, che ci piaccia o no, ‘ai sensi del diritto internazionale, la Novorossija ha lo stesso status di qualsiasi altro membro delle nazioni della comunità – è una nazione indipendente e sovrana’.

Il dott. Levy propone che la Novorossija formi un proprio tribunale internazionale e gli dia l’indipendenza di agire in sostituzione delle Nazioni Unite, della Corte penale internazionale e del Consiglio d’Europa, dando la possibilità ad avvocati e giuristi provenienti da tutto il mondo, che cercano di promuovere la causa della giustizia, di partecipare usando Internet e altre tecnologie. Egli sostiene, che “sono la partecipazione e il sostegno internazionale che daranno la sostanza al tribunale proposto”.

Se questo accadrà, sarà un notevole passo verso la creazione di una vera e propria società civile internazionale con un proprio sistema di giustizia, alimentato dalla tecnologia moderna (maggiori dettagli qui), che sarebbe indipendente dai leader internazionali e delle loro organizzazioni di lacchè, che finora hanno mostrato pochi segni di preoccupazione per portare alla giustizia le vittime civili dell’Ucraina orientale.

Vera Graziadei       (traduzione italiana di padre Ambrogio)


October 23, 2014
Continuano a sbatterci il grugno che e’ un piacere…..

Il prof. Luigi Di Bella durante una conferenza nel 1999

La “notizia” è controllabile direttamente da chiunque e indubbiamente fa sgranare tanto d’occhi. Ce l’ha segnalata un biologo assai preparato che lavora in Gran Bretagna e con il quale siamo in rapporto: ma non quale scoop. Era infatti convinto ne fossimo a conoscenza, e che, trattandosi di acquisizione ormai pacifica in campo scientifico, nulla giustificasse sorprese o clamori.
Diciamo subito di cosa si tratta, senza tenere in sospeso il lettore come per artificio di scrittore di gialli. Tutti siamo a conoscenza di come, in Italia, certi iper-farmacologi si siano sempre sgolati intorno all’inutilità terapeutica della Melatonina, relegata all’unico ruolo di rimedio per il jet-lag. Questi personaggi hanno poi accompagnato con sorrisetti sardonici e gesti mimanti assurdità di concetti la…pretesa che questo pseudo ormone potesse avere effetti antitumorali.
Naturalmente hanno sempre fatto eco drappelli di “scodinzolantes” della farmacologia, alcuni dei quali gli debbono la cattedra, mentre altri sperano di conseguirla sfidandosi a singolar tenzone in velocità di rotazione della coda, o in scatti centometristi e lingua penzoloni al primo “Fidooooo..qua!” giungesse ai loro orecchi.
Poi…poi è successo che molti ricercatori, specie stranieri, appartenenti alla categoria dei “disobbedientes”,  hanno ripreso quanto espresso decenni prima, ben più compiutamente ed approfonditamente di loro, da un certo signore che provocava i suddetti sorrisetti di sufficienza. E sono cominciati i guai. Non senza mutare l’impostazione degli “iper” citati, che hanno continuato a confinare il ruolo della sostanza al famoso jet-lag: in base al principio, ben noto ai veterani dell’anti-verità, che l’unica via di scampo è insistere, e insistere, e ancora insistere sulle panzane dette, specie se si dispone di formazioni corali di ragli a quattro voci.
Ed ecco il fattaccio. Molti conoscono di nome la Sigma-Aldrich, gigante della farmaceutica con sede a St. Louis, Missouri (Usa), con quasi diecimila dipendenti e operatività in 40 paesi. L’azienda, fondata nel 1975, offre un campionario di 100.000 prodotti chimici, ed è considerata all’avanguardia nel settore delle bio-tecnologie. Molti dei suoi prodotti sono valutati il topqualitativo da parte di chimici e di biologi.

Per la cronaca, il gigante statunitense è stato di recente acquisito dal colosso tedesco Merck. Utile e…suggestivo leggere cosa osserva a proposito il caro amico Giancarlo Bergamini, del quale abbiamo pubblicato di recente un assai interessante articolo:
“la Sigma-Aldrich, che la tedesca Merck Kgaa ha concordato di acquisire per 17 miliardi di dollari cash (cioè con soldi “veri” anzichè in cambio di proprie azioni): .
In altre parole, l’inondazione di liquidità fornita a interesse zero dall’ineffabile Draghi, lungi dal rilanciare le nostre economie moribonde, consente a pochi big players di fare spese pazze in giro per il mondo (oltre a finanziare l’acquisto di azioni proprie, come già segnalatovi). By the way, trovo di un certo interesse la dichiarazione dell’amministratore delegato Rakesh Sachdev, secondo il quale Sigma-Aldrich interviene nel processo di ricerca e sviluppo di qualsiasi farmaco venga realizzato da qualsivoglia casa farmaceutica. Un altro caso di outsourcing. Voglio sperare che per Merck (che nel 2007 comperò Serono), oltre alla convenienza finanziaria, ci sia anche una ragione strategica”.
D’accordo, veniamo al dunque. Alla voce “Melatonin”, il catalogo Sigma-Aldrich riporta:
“Hormone; mediates photoperiodicity in mammals; inhibits cerebellar nitric oxide synthetase; peroxynitrite scavenger. Melatonin has complex effects on apoptotic pathways, inhibiting apoptosis in immune cells and neurons but enhancing apoptotic cell death of cancer cells. Inhibits proliferation/metastasis of breast cancer cells by inhibiting estrogen receptor action”.
Indipendentemente dal fatto che – come disse 45 anni fa il Prof. L. Di Bella, non si può considerare un ormone – quello che fa clamore è che sia considerato quale fatto scontato e saldamente acquisito (traduciamo) che “la melatonina ha effetti complessi sui percorsi apoptotici, inibendo l’apoptosi nelle cellule immunitarie e nei neuroni, ma migliorando la morte cellulare per apoptosi delle cellule tumorali. Inibisce la proliferazione e la metastatatizzazione delle cellule di cancro al seno, inibendo l’azione dei recettori degli estrogeni“.
E ora come la mettiamo italici farmacologi & C.? Che vogliamo fare: scrivere alla Sigma, cioè Merck, e raccomandare di cancellare la specifica? Scanso equivoci consigliamo di salvare in un file di word quanto appare nel seguente link:

Azionando il link di cui sopra, appare un lavoro, a mo’ di saggio, dell’ineffabile Russell Reiter, impareggiabile nell’autoproposizione e nel coltivare le relazioni sociali…..
Nel lavoro citato, che risale al 1999, Reiter si occupa, sotto il profilo sperimentale, del ruolo neuroprotettivo della Mlt. Leggiamo qualche passo del lavoro:
“Questa recensione riassume i risultati sperimentali relativi al ruolo neuroprotettivo della melatonina. In particolare, si concentra sulla ricerca rivolta al morbo di Huntington, al morbo di Alzheimer ed il Parkinson. La melatonina ha dimostrato di essere altamente efficace nel ridurre il danno ossidativo nel sistema nervoso centrale; questa efficacia deriva dalla sua capacità di purificare direttamente una grande quantità di radicali liberi e di funzionare come un antiossidante indiretto…… Un ulteriore vantaggio è la melatonina nel ridurre il danno ossidativo nel sistema nervoso centrale è la facilità con cui attraversa la barriera emato-encefalica. Questa combinazione di azioni rende la melatonina un agente farmacologico altamente efficace contro i danni dei radicali liberi. Il ruolo dei livelli fisiologici di melatonina nel prevenire il danno ossidativo nel cervello è attualmente in fase di test”.
I lettori più attenti, specie se di formazione scientifica, leggendo queste frasi si chiederebbero in quale anno il Prof. Di Bella abbia pubblicato il testo del quale abbiamo riportato alcune frasi. Certamente leggerebbero, invece di affermazioni condivisibili ma tutto sommato di superficie, ben più complesse dissertazioni su meccanismi d’azione e precise ragioni. Ma non chiediamo troppo ad un attento ascoltatore come Reiter – orecchio da percezione dei 20.000 hertz, ve lo assicuriamo – o meglio: dovremmo chiedergli come mai, trattandosi di farina vecchia di trent’anni (al momento della pubblicazione) e di ben altro mugnaio, perché non citi il nome del Prof. Di Bella nella bibliografia.

Siamo propensi a ritenere si tratti di smemoratezza, forse dovuta a qualche incipit di Alzheimer. Se ci venisse  a trovare, potremmo mostrargli molte delle lettere relative alla corrispondenza intercorsa con il Prof. Di Bella. Riportiamo a questo proposito un passo tratto da “Il Poeta della Scienza”:
“In maggio (1981) riceve una lettera del Prof. Russel J. Reiter, che aveva conosciuto al congresso di Amsterdam di due anni prima, e che gli ha chiesto di spedirgli alcune sue pubblicazioni. Nella lettera (del 14 maggio) il ricercatore americano lo ringrazia dei lavori speditigli – “..thanks for the very valuable reprint” – lo prega di inviargli sempre tutte le sue future pubblicazioni – “Please keep my name on your permanent mailing list” – e gli preannuncia che verrà a trovarlo il mese successivo, aggiungendo: “I hope at that time we can meet and discuss our mutual interests. I’m sure we have many things in common“. Il 20 giugno, giunto a Modena, lo va a trovare all’Istituto di Fisiologia e trascorre con lui, Deda e Scalera due giorni interi, loro ospite: dimostrerà in questa occasione di essere un buona forchetta e un buon…bicchiere; d’altra parte aveva preavvisato, in una successiva lettera che “I love Italian cuisine and look forward to indulging myself under the most authentic conditions!”. Rimane sbalordito di fronte al livello raggiunto dalle ricerche ed ancora di più dalla casistica clinica che gli è presentata ed illustrata. Di lì a poco compare una sua valutazione dell’opera di Luigi Di Bella, nella quale parla dell’efficacia della melatonina nelle trombocitopenie ed in altre sindromi ematologiche, nel libro “Annual Research Reviews”. Reiter fa riferimento anche al colloquio con Luigi a Modena, e conclude affermando “….this group had more experience in treating patients with melatonin than any other” (Annual Research Reviews – The Pineal Volume 6 – Russel J Reiter, Department of Anatomy the University of Texas, Health Science Center at San Antonio – Eden Press, 1981)”.
D’altronde, in base al famoso “carta canta”, gli mostreremmo anche il volume “The Pineal gland and cancer” (Ed. Brain research Promotion, Tübingen, 1988), del quale figura editore, oltre a Reiter, anche il grande Derek Gupta (maestro del Prof. Freybergh, direttore di Neuroendocrinology Letters): qui, tra altri lavori, è riportato a pag. 183 “Melatonin in thrombocytogenesis”, del Prof. Luigi Di Bella, ‘Division of General Physiology, Institute of Human Physiology, Modena, Italy’.
Si dirà: qui si parla di neurologia, non di oncologia. Ma il Prof. Reiter era ed è bene informato, e non gli saranno sfuggiti, tra gli altri, questi due lavori:
-“L. Di Bella et all.: The neurothropic action of melatonin” (International Symposium on nervous system regeneration, 1981)

– “L. Di Bella et all.: Some aspects of the neurothropic action of Melatonin” (EPSG, suppl. 5, Ed. P. Pevet, august 1984).
In conclusione: un semplice plagio? Plagio sì, ma non semplice, bensì Reiter-ato…..

Adolfo Di Bella


October 23, 2014

Divine Liturgy in Kirovskoye!

The next time you will remember your departed in a Pannikhida, please remember also the God’s servant Vyacheslav Gusakovsky and pray also for his family.

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October 22, 2014

Recently, German Left Party parliamentarian Alexander Neu gave an interview for Rossiya Segodnya. He shared his thoughts on several subjects, from the investigation and reaction by the European community to the crash of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 to German’s proclaimed neutrality in its involvement in Ukraine. Alexander is a member of the Left faction and a deputy in the Bundestag. He is Chairman of the German Defense Committee and is a former member of the Yugoslavian OCSE.

Hello Alexander, thank you for speaking with us, can you tell us please about your recent inquiry into the crash of MH17 and its results?

Alexander Neu: On September 6, I requested a deputy’s inquest to the German government concerning the Boeing which was shot down over Ukraine. I was given a reply, which has now been released to the public. It was clear from the reply that, firstly, the German government had no idea whether MH17 was actually shot down. Secondly, if it had been shot down, the government couldn’t answer who the responsible party was. This, in short, was the result of the query. Two days later, The Hague published its first interim report from the Dutch Safety Board and it was announced the plane was hit by a missile, but again it was not said by whom. So at this point, who was to blame this point was not answered.

The reason why I decided to make the inquest to the government was that immediately after the disaster, they used the German media to unanimously blame Russia, either by directly doing so or by accusing them of supporting the fighters in the east of Ukraine… and it was on this basis that sanctions were leveled against Russia – the first round of them. And now the German government has confirmed  that it does not know who shot down the Boeing. This is astounding, because it means the first round of sanctions was enacted on the basis of speculation.

Why, in your view, is the investigation of the disaster taking so long?

Alexander Neu: I can imagine an investigation of this sort requires a lot of time. On the other hand, I found it very interesting that two weeks after the plane went down, suddenly there was a lull, both in the Western media and by Western governments. This really surprised me. Western journalists presented this narrative that Russia knew for certain who had shot the plane down and so did Ukraine and the US, but no one wanted to talk about it, since it would only intensify the conflict. In my opinion, this supposition by journalists does not stand up to criticism. I am almost certain that if it was Russia or the rebels who were to blame, and the West knew about it, then everything would have been done to tell the world community about it, to say that Russia or the rebels had perpetrated it. Since this still has not happened, the question remains about who is really to blame. And from here there are some new avenues of thought opening up, namely, that it could have been the Ukrainian side, either due to negligence, by accident or through a deliberate action on their part, in order to place blame on Russia. This is also a possibility.

The territory where the plane’s debris fell was hit many times by mass shelling by Ukrainian artillery. So finding any new evidence is pretty unlikely now; almost everything there has been destroyed. Also, why have the conversations between the pilots and the dispatchers still not been released?

Alexander Neu: If the pilots were talking to someone, whoever it may be, and these discussions have not been published, it is another example of the failure to inform the public…Why is this information not being released? And the more important point is, why is this information being hushed up? Why is the investigation not transparently being carried out? Again and again this brings me back to the question about who benefits from all this. Perhaps it is Ukraine after all, together with the United States, of course, and the West as a whole.

The Ukrainian regime would not do anything without the approval of the United States. This regime is, above all, a puppet of the Americans. The German government is also trying to influence the Ukrainian regime, with its own interests in mind, but mainly it is the Americans. The German government is an integral part of the Western Bloc, including in the front against Russia, and in this sense there is a certain logic, if we are talking about her loyalty to the Bloc. But there is no logic when it comes to genuinely contributing to the investigation.

What do you think about the intention of the German government to send German military forces to the conflict zone in east Ukraine?

Alexander Neu: My colleague from the Left Party, Andrej Hunko, asked the OSCE in Vienna whether the organization had appealed to the German government for German drone support. The OSCE replied stating, and I emphasize this, that they did not ask either the German or the French government for support via drones. And they certainly did not ask for military support in the form of troops or other military support. On Wednesday I told this to [German Defense Minister] von der Leien at a meeting of the parliamentary defense committee, where Ms. Von der Leien had said that yes, the OSCE had asked for support, but she gave no specifics.

In other words, von der Leien is pushing the drones, even though the OSCE had not specifically asked for them. We, the faction of the Left, insist that Germany and the West as a whole have no right to interfere in the military conflict in Ukraine in any way, as an arbitrator, so to speak. This is because Germany and France and the entire European Union, as well as the members of NATO are a part of the conflict. They are a part of it because they support the putschist regime. They’re supporting the Ukrainian regime with instructors and intelligence assistance. You cannot be a part of the conflict and at the same time a judge or a neutral observer. We see that Switzerland, the chairman of the OSCE, provides its drones (because Switzerland has drones to provide). Moreover, Austria will also provide drones via a private company –there is an agreement between the OSCE and this Austrian company. And this is normal, because these countries are neutral. But Germany isn’t, especially from a historical point of view. If German soldiers end up in Ukraine, in the former Soviet Union, where 27 million people lie on their [historical] conscience; if we go there in army uniforms, building ourselves up as judges and observers, how will all this look?   (Yes, indeed…. German army in the Don basin! What could possibly go wrong? – ndM)